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here has been much speculation about the reasons that prompted President Putin’s 
increasingly hostile reaction in 2012-13 to the negotiations on an EU-Ukraine 
association agreement. The chain of events is well known. Russian pressure led the 
then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, to decline to sign an Association Agreement 
with the EU, which sparked the Euro Maidan in Kyiv. These protests were then used a 
pretext for the annexation of Crimea and the support for anti-Maidan rebels in the Donbass 
region, which was then followed by an outright, even if covert, invasion.  
It is often argued that Russia is reacting to a perceived encroachment of the EU/NATO on an 
area that it considers its own neighbourhood (and President Putin said as much during his 
annual end-of-the-year press conference in December). However, history suggests that the 
underlying reason for Russian aggressiveness is simpler: A decade-long period of a steadily 
rising oil prices (and that of other raw materials) created a feeling of strength, bordering on 
invulnerability, which made Russia more assertive, and ready to use any opportunity to 
deploy its military power. The abrupt reversal of this trend since the summer of 2014 will 
thus be the harbinger of a much less aggressive Russian stance as long as oil remains at 
present levels. 
One needs to go back only 40 years to find a similar development. The 1970s had seen a 
similar increase in Soviet assertiveness which culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan at 
the very end of the decade. This came also at the tail of a decade of sharply increasing oil 
prices (and Soviet oil production). Between 1965 and 1980, the value of Soviet oil production 
went up by a factor of almost 20 (from about $20 billion annually in 1965 to almost $400 
billion in today’s purchasing power in 1980). This was due in large part to the oil price 
increases following the first oil embargo. But there was also a large increase in Soviet oil 
production. In the 1960s, Soviet oil production had been lower than that of the US, but 
thanks to the discovery of some large fields it became much larger by 1980. This combination 
provided the main growth elements of the Soviet economy, making its regime much more 
credible, and not only in the eyes of its own population. The resulting increase in the real 
resources available to the Soviet elites was spent to a large extent on the military budget, 
allowing the Soviet Union to become a much more credible threat. The increase in relative, 
and absolute, economic and military strength emboldened an ageing (and therefore naturally 
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not adventurous leadership) to become more assertive abroad. The invasion of Afghanistan 
appeared also at first sight to be an improvised reaction to a local development (a putsch in 
Kabul). The parallel to Putin’s reaction to the Euro Maidan is instructive. In both cases, a 
seemingly low-cost opportunity was seen as yielding a large strategic gain, at least in the 
short run. 
The figures in the Annex shows the value of Soviet and Russian oil production in constant 
dollars over the last half century. It is apparent that high values are associated with foreign 
adventure, whereas Russia was much more cooperative when the value of its oil exports was 
low. 
At the time of the Soviet take-over of Afghanistan, it was often argued that this was a 
defensive reaction to the perceived encirclement of the Soviet Union. This motive might have 
been latently present for a long time; but without the economic and military strength coming 
from higher oil prices the Soviet Union would most probably not have acted on it. 
The end of the Afghan adventure is now known, but this was not clear at the time, when it 
was interpreted as a major defeat of the West. It is often forgotten that a major element of the 
Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was the weakening of the economic base of the Soviet Union as 
oil prices fell throughout the 1980s, cutting the value of Soviet oil production to one-third of 
its peak level. This led to a period of extreme economic weakness in the entire Soviet space 
and was a key factor (but of course not the only one) in the dissolution of the Soviet empire.  
The 1990s then saw a protracted period of low oil prices and production during which time 
Russia was absorbed by its own internal problems given that the value of its oil production 
had plummeted to less than $60 billion and did not object to EU (or even NATO) 
enlargement to the East. This changed gradually during the early 2000s as the oil price (and 
production) recovered in Russia, again strengthening the economic base of an increasingly 
autocratic leadership. The complaint that the US and its European allies had somehow given 
a pledge not to expand NATO eastward came mostly after the fact as oil prices recovered 
from their low of $10/barrel in 1999-2000. 
The steady upwards trend in oil prices during the early 2000s culminated in a first peak of 
the value of Russian oil production in 2008 and the invasion of Georgia. The oil price 
collapsed briefly during the Great Recession of 2009, but it recovered quickly, and the value 
of Russian oil production reached another peak in 2012-13 when the value of its oil 
production topped $500 billion. These were also the years during which the Russian position 
on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement hardened. The negotiations on this agreement 
had been going on since 2010 without eliciting any particular reaction from Russia. And so, 
the objections suddenly voiced by Russia when the agreement was close to being concluded 
appeared to come out of nowhere for the EU side. 
The swings in the oil price provide a telling background to the swings in Russia’s attitude 
towards its ‘near abroad’. A latent resentment is expressed in a more aggressive form, 
including military means, when the resources are available. Moreover, a high oil price 
crowds out other export sectors that would be interested in open markets. 
The Afghan adventure was followed by a longer-term decline in oil prices. The very recent 
slide in the oil price suggests that history is about to repeat itself. At a price of $60/barrel, the 
value of Russian oil production will return to the levels last seen about 10 years ago, when 
Russia was much less aggressive than it is today. This suggests that a stalemate in the 
Donbass is more likely for the time being than an outright offensive aimed at occupying the 
remainder of the region and establishing a land corridor to Crimea. The Nova Russia project 
has no chance with oil at current prices. 
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The EU and US sanctions, which seemed to constitute only a pinprick a few months ago, 
now appear to have inflicted much more serious damage as the sudden slide in oil prices is 
compounded by financial-market turmoil. Financial markets will find a new level for the 
exchange rate and then calm down again. What will stay will be a considerably weaker 
Russian economy on which the sanctions will impose a much greater burden than appeared 
to be the case with oil above $100/barrel. 
A new, less aggressive, Russia is likely to emerge with the new equilibrium in the oil market. 
 
Annex 
Figure 1 shows the annual volume of Soviet and later Russian oil production multiplied by 
the price of oil in real terms. 
Figure 1. The value of Russia’s oil in constant USD 
 
Source: BP Statistical Handbook. 
Figure 2 shows the volume of Soviet/Russian oil production (blue line, left-hand scale) 
separately from the real price of oil (orange line, right-hand scale). 
It is apparent that movements in the price have been highly correlated with production, 
amplifying the impact of price movements on the value of output. This is what one would 
expect: as the price of oil diminishes, production will be reduced. However, there have also 
been political amplifiers: the chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union (partially 
related to lower oil prices) led to a reduction in production. The introduction of market 
reforms, reinforced by higher oil prices led to a recovery of production during the 2000s. The 
next years are likely to see a repetition of this correlation as the combined effect of the 
sanctions (reduced availability of capital and technology) and the less market-friendly 
environment in Russia will probably lead to lower production volumes. 
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Figure 2. Source of the value in Soviet/Russian oil production 
 
Source: BP Statistical Handbook. 
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